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Executive Summary
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration was born with a heavy load to
bear – the obligation of ensuring that every worker in America has a safe and healthful
workplace for his or her entire working life. In its early years, OSHA acted with great vigor,
establishing important standards for occupational health and safety that have prevented
hundreds of thousands of injuries and illnesses. But the agency has not aged gracefully.
Today its enforcement staff is stretched thin and the rulemaking staff struggle to produce
health and safety standards that can withstand industry legal challenges. In short, OSHA is a
picture of regulatory dysfunction.
Regulatory dysfunction in the federal government is manifest in administrative agencies
that lack the resources, statutory authority, leadership, and affirmative help from the White
House to accomplish the goals Congress has set out for them. OSHA’s current leadership
– Assistant Secretary David Michaels and Deputy Assistant Secretary Jordan Barab – are
committed to revitalizing the embattled agency by turning it into a professional regulator and
competent enforcement agency. But Michaels and Barab have inherited a resource-starved
agency operating under a statute that has been enfeebled by 30 years of troubling appellate
court decisions and White House initiatives that substantially increase the time and effort
needed to implement a proactive regulatory agenda.
This white paper explores the causes of OSHA’s regulatory dysfunctions and describes their
negative impacts on OSHA and America’s workers. With the decreasing power of unions to
organize and press employers to implement strong health and safety programs, employees in
every occupation rely on OSHA to protect them from occupational hazards. Yet, in the last
decade, OSHA has dropped more standards from its regulatory agenda than it has finalized,
largely due to insufficient budget authority. And the agency’s enforcement program has
assessed such paltry fines for even fatality-related violations of the law that many employers
see no incentive in addressing hazards, much less developing precautionary health and safety
programs.
After describing OSHA’s problems in detail, this paper outlines a number of reforms that
could enhance the agency’s performance. Although certain aspects of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act could use improvement, the recommendations in this paper focus on
regulatory reform – that is, administrative actions that OSHA could implement in the short
term. A subsequent white paper will address legislative reform.
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TABLE 1.

Recommendations for OSHA Regulatory Reform

Enforcement

• Use the General Duty Clause to protect workers who are exposed to chemicals that lack OSHA-derived Permissible Exposure Levels.
• End the practice of regularly discounting penalties before they’re even proposed.
• Publish all negotiated settlement proposals for public comment.
• Conduct a rigorous analysis of what resources would be required to make the OSHA inspection program a
credible threat for employers chronically out of compliance, restoring the efficacy of deterrence-based enforcement throughout the agency.
• Based on that analysis, request substantial increases in funding from the White House.
• Redesign the scope and priorities of National Emphasis Programs, seeking advice of inspection staff.
• Improve training to promote criminal referrals.
• Work with state and local prosecutors to prompt criminal indictments in certain cases.
• Rethink the proper balance between traditional enforcement (inspections) and “compliance assistance.”

Rulemaking

•
•
•
•
•
•

Recordkeeping

Seek additional resources to increase rulemaking staff.
Ask the Solicitor of Labor for a new analysis of risk assessment burdens imposed by the Benzene decision.
Use generic standards to combine multiple hazards or agenda items into a single rulemaking.
Avoid the use of negotiated rulemaking.
Conduct peer reviews, when necessary, concurrently with public comment periods and hearings.
Improve transparency with respect to the White House Office of Management and Budget’s interaction with
the agency.

• Update IMIS (OSHA’s Integrated Management Information System).
• Work with the Bureau of Labor Statistics to improve the quality of injury and illness statistics.
• Develop a strategy for eliminating employer prizes and disciplinary actions that lead to incorrect injury and
illness reporting.
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Introduction
In 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on the state of
occupational safety and health programs in the meat and poultry industry that painted a
picture eerily reminiscent of the images described in Upton Sinclair’s 1906 masterpiece,
The Jungle. GAO’s account of conditions endured by newly immigrated workers in the
slaughterhouse industry provides a shocking reminder that occupational hazards are not
confined to heavy industry.
The type of work performed and the plant environment expose workers to
many hazards. The work is physically demanding, repetitive, and often requires working in extreme temperatures—such as in refrigeration units that
range from below zero to 40 degrees Fahrenheit—and plants often have high
turnover rates. Workers often stand for long periods of time on production
lines that move very quickly, wielding knives or other cutting instruments
used to trim or remove portions of the carcasses. Conditions at the plant
can also be loud, wet, dark, and slippery. Workers responsible for cleaning
the plant must use strong chemicals and hot pressurized water to clean inside and around dangerous machinery, and may experience impaired visibility
because of steam. … While the most common injuries are cuts, strains, cumulative trauma caused by repetitive cutting motions, and injuries sustained
from falls, more serious injuries, such as fractures and amputation, also occur.
For example, according to OSHA data, a worker died when he attempted to
replace his knife in the scabbard hanging from his belt, missed the opening,
and pushed the knife into his leg, severing his femoral artery. In addition,
some workers become ill because of exposure to chemicals, blood, and fecal
matter, which can be exacerbated by poor ventilation and extreme temperatures.1
What differentiates the workers in today’s meatpacking industry from the workers in the
early 1900s is the existence of a law – the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)
– and an agency – the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) – that
were designed to ensure modern workers would have a safe and healthful workplace. The
OSH Act paved the way for federal regulatory standards that are “reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.”2 And it
worked. OSHA’s health and safety standards have been credited with a significant decrease
in work-related illness and injury where those standards have been created and enforced.
The “lockout/tagout” standard, which required the installation of devices to ensure that
heavy machinery was not turned on while repairs were being made, for instance, was credited
with 30-percent annual reductions in lockout-related fatalities in the auto industry in its first
eight years and a 55-percent reduction in lockout/tagout-related fatalities at ten basic steelproducing companies between 1990 and 1997.3
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However, in more recent years, illness and injury rates have stopped declining, and today’s
injury and illness rates are virtually the same as 15 years ago, suggesting that OSHA is
not utilizing new and evolving knowledge about managing occupational hazards to foster
improvements in U.S. workplaces.
Observing OSHA in its struggle to implement and enforce the OSH Act is a study of
regulatory dysfunction. OSHA and its state partners employ fewer than 2,100 inspectors
to keep tabs on more than 8 million U.S. workplaces.4 OSHA must meet so many analytical
requirements that it takes more than a decade to implement a single new standard. By one
count, OSHA is subject to 18 different statutory, court-created, and administrative limits on
its rulemaking process.5
Organizational structures that separate enforcement staff, rulemaking staff, researchers,
and agency lawyers prevent OSHA from operating as efficiently as possible. This paper
describes, in detail, how these sources of regulatory dysfunction have serious implications
for workers’ health and safety and lists a series of legal and regulatory reforms that could
reinvigorate the troubled agency.
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Resource Shortfalls
Regulatory dysfunction at any agency, and in particular at OSHA, begins with resource
constraints. Often, the most difficult and most important work for a regulatory agency
is the most resource-intensive. Enforcement that has a meaningful deterrent effect is the
prime example. Inspectors must be trained and deployed across the entire country. OSHA
must develop fair and effective mechanisms for targeting the most dangerous worksites for
inspection by trained personnel. If conducted properly, a compliance assessment at a very
large worksite might take 2,000 employee-hours. The accompanying legal proceedings can
drag on for months or years. In Fiscal Year 2010, OSHA will spend about $227 million
on federal enforcement programs, but will only have the capacity to inspect 40,000 of the
nation’s more than 8 million workplaces.
Proactive rulemaking to manage emerging hazards, such as lung disease linked to diacetyl,
and other flavoring chemicals used in the popcorn industry, can also be a huge resource
drain. Every type of OSHA employee – economists, engineers, occupational health
specialists, lawyers – is involved in the development of new health and safety standards.
Coordinating their work is difficult and costly.
Yet, OSHA operates on a shoestring budget. OSHA’s budget climbed steadily in the 1970s,
funding the agency’s growing capacity to develop new rules and enforce the OSH Act,
which in turn triggered a backlash from the business community. Under the Reagan and
George H.W. Bush administrations, OSHA’s budget was first cut and then held roughly even
with inflation. The Clinton administration gave OSHA a boost, and the agency’s budget
reached an historic high in 2001. But that was the same year that the agency published its
ill-fated ergonomics standard, and, like OSHA’s aggressive enforcement in the late 1970s,
the ergonomics standard elicited a backlash in the business community and a subsequent
whittling-away of the agency’s budget under George W. Bush.
Figure 1:

FY 2010 Proposed Budget

Technical Support ($25.9M)

Executive direction ($11.5M)

5% 2%

Total Budget:
$563 Million

Compliance assistance — federal
($73.4M)

13%
Compliance assistance —
state ($54.6M)
Training grants ($10M)

40%

Federal enforcement
($227M)

10%
2%

6%

Safety and health statistics
($34.9M)
Safety and health standards
($19.6M)

3%

19%
State programs ($106M)
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Historical Comparison: Workforce vs. Compliance Staff *
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Figure 2:

One important feature of OSHA’s budget is the part of OSHA’s annual budget authority
that is distributed to various states. Under the OSH Act, individual states can assume
responsibility for protecting workers’ health and safety by creating state-level laws,
institutions, and resources that are at least as effective in providing safe and healthful
workplaces as OSHA and the OSH Act.6 The Secretary of Labor has approved 27 such
“state plans,” although in five states the state’s jurisdiction only covers public employees.
When a state plan is approved, OSHA generally relinquishes responsibility for inspecting
worksites in the state but provides the state with significant funding to carry out its
occupational safety and health program. States may receive up to 50 percent of their
occupational safety and health budgets in the form of federal grants. For the last ten years
(prior years’ breakdowns were not readily available), about one-fifth of OSHA’s proposed
budget has been distributed to state-plan states.
Of the remaining 80 percent of the agency’s budget, half is spent on federal enforcement
activities (worksite inspections and accident and whistleblower investigations), and half is
spent on all of OSHA’s other activities. This last 40 percent of OSHA’s budget is where
the priorities are the most skewed. Almost a quarter of OSHA’s total budget is directed
to compliance assistance programs that have a weak track record. A mere 2 percent of
the budget goes to worker training programs, and just 3 percent of the budget goes to
improving health and safety standards. The small percentage of OSHA’s budget spent on
rulemaking only begins to tell the story. Claiming that insufficient resources stand in the
way, OSHA has withdrawn more rules from its regulatory agenda than it has finalized in the
last decade.7
OSHA’s $513 million budget for Fiscal Year 2009 is less than 0.02 percent of the year’s $3.1
trillion total federal outlays, such an infinitesimal portion that funding the agency at adequate
levels would not affect the country’s capacity to reduce the deficit in any meaningful manner.
Adequate funding for the agency would mean improving the ratio of inspectors to workers.
In the late 1970s, the ratio of federal inspectors to federally protected workers was about
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1 to 30,000. Today, an OSHA inspector covers more than 60,000 workers. Increasing
the number of federal inspectors, along with a corresponding increase in funding to state
programs would yield obvious improvements in workers’ safety and health. In recent years,
OSHA has been able to increase enforcement staff at a cost of about $125,000 per full time
staff person. Doubling the enforcement staff would obviously involve significant other
costs (infrastructure, etc.), so at a minimum, OSHA would need another $125 million per
year. We recommend that OSHA initiate an objective and critical analysis of what resources
are necessary to conduct inspections with a frequency that employers once again are
concerned about becoming the target of deterrence-based enforcement.
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An Outmoded Rulemaking Process
The foundation of any successful regulatory program is effective regulations. They provide
a starting point for enforcement programs, predictability for the regulated community, and
– most importantly – protection from hazardous conditions. In the nearly 40 years since
its enactment, the OSH Act has been exposed as a virtually useless tool for establishing
occupational health and safety standards. As interpreted by the courts, the OSH Act requires
such extensive analysis of hazardous conditions and potential regulatory interventions
before OSHA can regulate that the agency has only been able to set standards for the most
obvious and egregious problems (e.g., machines that could accidentally begin operating while
employees are servicing them). Occupational hazards that can cause less obvious injuries
– for instance, lung cancer that does not manifest for decades or developmental problems
in a pregnant worker’s child – are left unabated or are regulated only through limits set in
the early 1970s by private and quasi-public standard-setting organizations relying on science
from the 1940s and ’50s. The OSH Act’s standard-setting provisions are the second major
source of OSHA’s dysfunction.
OSHA standards come in two forms – health standards and safety standards. Health
standards address hazards like lead, chromium, asbestos, or other toxic substances that cause
illnesses when employees are exposed to them either for short or long durations. Safety
standards are designed to prevent injuries caused by harmful physical agents, like stairs or
raised platforms without railings or industrial machinery without guards around moving
parts. The distinction is important because the courts have interpreted the rulemaking
requirements for the two types of standards differently. The legal requirements for setting
health standards are more stringent. In practice, however, OSHA must navigate a political
gauntlet that makes development of any standard an arduous process. Since updating the
exposure limits for methylene chloride in 1997, OSHA has revised just one other health
standard (hexavalent chromium) and created two new safety standards (vertical tandem lifts
at marine terminals and fire protection in shipyards). OSHA has made revisions to a number
of other standards, but it has not finalized any new health standards related to chemicals that
were not already covered by OSHA standards.
OSHA’s inability to establish new health standards more efficiently can be traced, in large
part, to a Supreme Court decision that gave the agency analytical burdens not intended
by Congress. In AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,8 commonly known as the Benzene
decision, the Supreme Court held that OSHA must determine that workplace exposure
creates a “significant risk” before it can regulate. The OSH Act’s rulemaking requirements
do not use the term “significant risk,” leading legal scholars to criticize the decision as an
example of judicial over-reaching.
The practical problem with Benzene is that the high court failed to provide useful guidance
as to what analysis OSHA should undertake to prove a significant risk. The Supreme Court
famously said that a one-in-a-thousand cancer risk would clearly be a “significant” risk, but a
one-in-a-billion risk might be considered “insignificant.” With little else to build on, OSHA
Workers at Risk: Regulatory Dysfunction at OSHA
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staff must undertake extensive quantitative risk assessments for any hazard they believe
needs to be controlled through regulation. To get a sense of the burden, a mere summary
of OSHA’s risk assessment on the 2006 hexavalent chromium standard took up 117 pages
of the Federal Register.9 The entire rulemaking process took more than a decade and was only
completed under court order.
Although the “significant risk” requirement does not apply to safety standards, OSHA
is required to prove that safety standards are economically “feasible.” A feasibility
determination includes an analysis of the costs of compliance in relation to consumer prices
and the financial health and profitability of the industry.10 However, the Supreme Court
has also held that OSHA need not determine that costs bear a “reasonable relationship”
to benefits, the issue at stake in traditional cost-benefit analysis, because the feasibility
analysis required by the OSH Act is intended to be a significantly less demanding test.11
Nonetheless, feasibility analyses can result in regulations that are less protective then they
might be otherwise. For example, like other federal agencies, OSHA is overly dependent on
the regulated industry for data regarding the costs of compliance, but industry’s estimates
often exceed actual compliance costs, sometimes by orders of magnitude.12 Moreover,
OSHA is overly focused on demonstrating the feasibility of controlling hazards using
existing technology, neglecting to analyze emerging or cutting-edge technologies, process
changes, or other options that are more cost-effective but might lack data on the economic
costs of implementation. The agency’s excessively cautious interpretation of the statute is
the primary reason why the OSH Act, while clearly intended by Congress to be technologyforcing, has failed in that regard. OSHA policymakers tend to be gun-shy about using
regulation to force new technologies because they fear that the lack of historical economic
data will prevent the new standard from standing up to the courts’ “hard look” review.13
“Hard look” review, a general standard for judicial review of regulatory decisionmaking
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), is uniquely stringent in the context of the
OSH Act. Typically, courts review administrative actions by taking a “hard look” at the
record of evidence the agency has developed to ensure its completeness, and then examining
the agency’s decision to ensure that it is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. But the
OSH Act includes an instruction about judicial review not found in other statutes. Section
6(f) states that OSHA rules “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the
record considered as a whole.”14 Congress’s requirement that OSHA’s rules be supported
by “substantial evidence in the record” signals to the courts that the legislature wanted more
searching review than is applied to regulations issued by other agencies. As a result, OSHA
staff spend large amounts of time and resources developing the data needed to support
significant risk determinations and economic feasibility analyses.
As if the burdens found in the OSH Act were not enough, Congress and the Executive
Branch have devised additional hurdles for OSHA to overcome before it can regulate
occupational hazards. As noted, 18 different statutory, court-created, and administrative
procedural limits slow the OSHA rulemaking process. Executive Orders on regulatory
Workers at Risk: Regulatory Dysfunction at OSHA
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impact and flexibility analyses are some of the most problematic, because they give White
House officials significant sway over the shape of new rules, to the detriment of OSHA’s
experts. The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has even mandated
external peer review of certain scientific documents, which might do more to delay new
rules than it does to improve their quality. Congress, too, has established a number of
impediments to development of new occupational safety and health standards, through
statutes that have failed to achieve their “good government” objectives. Examples include
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Paperwork Reduction Act, Congressional Review Act, and
Information Quality Act.

18 different
statutory,
courtcreated, and
administrative
procedural
limits slow
the OSHA
rulemaking
process.

The Small Business Regulatory Fairness Act (SBREFA) is often the largest obstacle in the
standards-development process. Before OSHA can even publish a proposed rule in the
Federal Register, it must convene and gather input from a Small Business Advocacy Review
Panel. These panels comprise several Small Entity Representatives, officials from the
Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy, and officials from OMB’s Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs. While OSHA officials have expressed appreciation
for SBREFA panels’ input, suggesting that they bring to light issues not originally realized
by agency staff, it is not clear that these panels provide any information that could not have
simply waited until the notice of proposed rulemaking was published in the Federal Register.
The panels create delays in the rulemaking process without producing any intrinsic benefits.
Over the years, there have been a number of attempts to devise new ways to prioritize
and conduct OSHA rulemaking, but each has come up short. Unions and public interest
organizations have attempted to use the OSH Act’s provision for emergency temporary
standards to force the agency to act. When employees are exposed to “grave danger,”
the OSH Act empowers OSHA to issue emergency temporary standards as direct final
rules, without having to go through the normal OSH Act or APA procedures. Following
publication of the direct final rule, OSHA must go back and start a standard rulemaking for
the hazard at issue. Though OSHA has issued a few emergency temporary standards, it has
more often denied requests to do so from outside groups.
In 1988, OSHA Administrator John Pendergrass tried to update more than 300 health
standards in one fell swoop, only to have those updates thrown out by a federal court. From
1970 until 1972, Congress had given OSHA the power to adopt certain occupational health
standards without undertaking the normal rulemaking procedures. Through the expedited
process, OSHA adopted more than 400 standards based on recommendations from
quasi-public standard-setting organizations like the American Council of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). OSHA failed to update those standards in
the intervening years, so Pendergrass attempted a single rulemaking in which 212 of the
original PELs would be updated and 164 new substances would be regulated, largely based
on recommendations from ACGIH and NIOSH. This generic approach was thrown out by
the 11th Circuit because OSHA had not adequately analyzed the risks and feasibility for each
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hazard, which the court understood was required by the Supreme Court’s Benzene decision
and the D.C. Circuit’s Lead I decision.15
OSHA has tried to use negotiated rulemaking (“Neg/Reg”) to speed up its production of
standards, but this has proven to be no solution. Through negotiated rulemaking, OSHA
brings together the stakeholders who would normally stand at loggerheads and asks them
to negotiate a rulemaking proposal that the agency will then use as the basis for regulation.
OSHA proposes the general contours of the proposed standard and the stakeholders are
given broad leeway to craft its content in the expectation that they will agree on a standard,
paving the way for OSHA to enact it and eliminating judicial challenges by stakeholders.
The Neg/Reg process has been attempted several times, yet it has produced little progress.
Either the groups cannot come to agreement (e.g., benzene negotiations in 1983-84) or, even
when they do, unanimous consensus is not reached and the standard ends up at the center
of the same battles it would have been absent the Neg/Reg process (e.g., cranes and derricks
negotiations proposal, under review with the Secretary of Labor for over five years now).
OSHA’s rulemaking process is in need of drastic reforms. At the same time chemical
manufacturers are creating about 700 new chemicals each year, OSHA is drafting new health
standards at a rate of about two per decade. And out of the tens of thousands of chemicals
that are already on the market, OSHA has set standards for only about 400. Those standards
are almost 40 years old already, and based on science from the 1940s and 1950s. Congress,
to its credit, has occasionally set strict deadlines for promulgation of new standards (e.g.,
lead, hexavalent chromium) and OSHA has been able to meet them. But OSHA still
operates under heavy burdens imposed by the courts and the White House, and Congress
must consider changes to the OSH Act that will free the agency to set standards more easily.
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Enforcement

With more
than 8.6 million
workplaces
in the United
States, 2,400
federal and
state inspectors
cannot inspect
even a small
fraction in any
given year.

When OSHA first began enforcing the consensus standards it adopted in the early 1970s,
the agency’s inspectors made the strategic mistake of strictly enforcing even the most
trivial facets of the standards. Employers were appalled by what they perceived to be a
heavy-handed and adversarial new federal agency and they took their case to Congress and
the Reagan administration, which slashed OSHA’s funding in the early 1980s. Since then,
OSHA has struggled to design a broadly effective enforcement program that properly
balances traditional enforcement proceedings with voluntary programs. OSHA’s difficulty
in designing an adequate enforcement regime is reflected in the national injury and illness
statistics, which, as noted earlier, are virtually the same as fifteen years ago. Resources,
both money and staff, are a significant problem, of course. But another major impediment
to a more effective enforcement regime is the agency’s failure to collect adequate data to
determine which programs are working and which programs are not.
Traditional Enforcement
OSHA employs about 1,100 inspectors and state-plan states employ another 1,300
inspectors. With more than 8.6 million workplaces in the United States., and some
inspections demanding more than 2,000 hours to complete, federal and state officials cannot
be expected to inspect even a small fraction of U.S. worksites in any given year. OSHA’s
inspection of the BP Texas City oil refinery, for instance, delivered a record $87 million fine
proposal, but it took six months to complete.
Instead, OSHA has adopted a number of different programs to prioritize its work so as to
have the most significant impact on reducing occupational injury and illness rates. OSHA
inspectors’ primary focus is on “unprogrammed” inspections, i.e., investigations of fatalities,
catastrophes, reports of imminent danger, worker complaints, and referrals from other
inspectors or other government officials. Unprogrammed inspections make up about a third
of OSHA’s annual inspections. With their remaining time, inspectors work on programmed
inspections. OSHA’s three main programs for identifying worksites in need of inspection are
the Local and National Emphasis Programs (LEPs and NEPs), the Site-Specific Targeting
program (SST), and the Enhanced Enforcement Program (EEP).
‘Unprogrammed’ Complaint Inspections

Inspections conducted in response to complaints make up a majority of OSHA’s
unprogrammed inspections. When OSHA receives a complaint about a workplace hazard,
the complaint is categorized and prioritized based on the severity of the alleged problem.
Allegations of serious violations (those that could result in death, permanent disability,
chronic or irreversible illness, amputation, blindness, or third degree burns) elicit on-site
inspections, as do written and signed complaints from current employees that provide
reasonable grounds for believing that a specific OSHA standard is being violated. OtherWorkers at Risk: Regulatory Dysfunction at OSHA
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than-serious allegations are investigated by OSHA employees over the telephone or using
faxed letters of inquiry in order to conserve agency resources and maintain a less adversarial
relationship between the agency and regulated employers. Between 2000 and 2002, twothirds of complaint inspections were conducted by phone or fax.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied several years of inspection data
and discovered problems typical of the dysfunctions that run throughout the agency.16 For
one, GAO found wide non-compliance with the requirement that regional administrators
annually conduct audits of their area offices’ operations. With only five of ten regional
offices conducting the required audits, OSHA headquarters cannot properly assess whether
complaint response programs are working well. GAO also found that when inspectors go
out to worksites to investigate serious complaints, they only discover violations in about 50
percent of their visits, raising an issue of whether this type of investigation is the best use of
OSHA’s resources. This result, however, may be tied to the fact that, under current policies,
inspectors who go to worksites to investigate complaints are limited to only investigating
violations alleged by the complainant. Blatantly obvious violations observed in the course
of an inspection will be considered, but inspectors may only expand their work into a
comprehensive inspection if doing so would comport with the OSH Act, “Area Office
priorities,” and “pre-determined criteria from their offices [used] to determine the necessity
for expanding the scope of an investigation.”17 This approach, which is undoubtedly driven
by OSHA’s chronic lack of resources, defeats efforts to build a credible, deterrence-based
enforcement program because it robs OSHA of the opportunity to make the most out of its
inspection process.
Local and National Emphasis Programs (LEPs and NEPs)

The starting point for OSHA’s programmed inspections is a complex scheme that ranks
industries by nationwide injury and illness rates, groups them according to hazard type
(safety hazard versus health hazard) and relative injury rates, and then generates randomized
lists of workplaces for inspection. Since this system does not always ensure inspection
priorities that reflect administration policy or emerging occupational safety and health
concerns, OSHA uses special emphasis programs – NEPs and LEPs – to target specific
industries and hazards. LEPs are chosen by regional and area office staff based on their
experience with local employers, and the programs are subject to approval by the national
office. NEPs are designated at the national level. While designation of an NEP by the
national office ensures that each regional and area office adopts a parallel local plan, regional
and area office staff retain significant flexibility in choosing worksites for inspection within
the industries covered by the NEP. OSHA has approved more than 140 LEPs, eleven NEPs,
and one pilot NEP.
Local and regional enforcement staff, the OSHA personnel most intimately involved in
day-to-day enforcement proceedings with employers, have voiced support for LEPs because
they believe that professional experience is a better guide in choosing inspection targets

NEPs for FY 2010
• Trenching Hazards
• Petroleum Refinery
Process Safety
Management
• Shipbreaking
• Amputations
• Crystalline Silica
• Lead
• Combustible Dust
• Chemical Facility PSM
(Pilot in Regions I, VI, X)
• Diacetyl and other Food
Flavoring Chemicals
• Primary Metals
• Occupational Asthma
• Recordkeeping
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than a neutrally oriented computer program. NEPs garner less support from the rankand-file because of the perception that they are defined by beltway politics instead of field
experience.
Site-Specific Targeting (SST)

The SST program complements the normal programmed enforcement system and emphasis
programs by identifying and targeting for inspection the most dangerous worksites in
high-hazard industries. However, this program excludes the construction industry, which
has become notorious for excessive injuries, especially because it relies on migrant laborers
who are not well-trained. An analysis by The Texas Observer, for example, estimated that
a construction worker in Texas dies every two and a half days, including such avoidable
incidents as collapsing trenches. Like the standard programmed enforcement system, SST
utilizes a nationwide database to randomly select worksites for inspection. However, the
SST program selects only worksites within industries that are considered “high-hazard,” a
designation linked to high injury and illness rates and high levels of employment. Each year,
OSHA sends out an information request to about two-thirds of the 140,000 worksites in the
United States with more than 40 employees, asking them for information about how many
employees worked for them in the previous year, how many hours they worked, and for a
summary of the data from their injury and illness logs. OSHA then computes injury and
illness rates and creates lists of worksites with relatively high rates. OSHA’s regional offices
then log into a system that randomly selects for inspection worksites in their geographical
jurisdiction from the master lists. In total across the country, OSHA conducts 2,000 to 4,000
SST inspections each year.
Despite all of the work OSHA puts into data gathering and analysis to support the SST
program, GAO concluded – and some officials at OSHA’s regional and area offices agreed
– that the program does not effectively identify hazardous worksites.18 GAO found “that
for about half the worksites identified through this process, inspectors were unable to do an
inspection or, if they did, cited no serious violations.” OSHA staff have expressed concern
that these success rates are not a large enough increase over the NEP/LEP system to justify
the considerable resources that go into collecting and analyzing the data needed to run the
SST system. One problem is that the SST system relies on a single year’s injury and illness
data to target inspection sites, a flaw in the model that fails to recognize trends and could put
too much emphasis on outlier years. In addition, the data is not always reliable, which means
SST inspections have been triggered by employers’ poor recordkeeping rather than their
inability to ensure workers’ health and safety. Finally, the data that drive the SST program
might be useful for identifying worksites with serious safety hazards, but they are relatively
useless for identifying noncompliance with health standards because the impacts of these
failures will take many years to manifest themselves.

Workers at Risk: Regulatory Dysfunction at OSHA

Center for Progressive Reform

Page 15

Enhanced Enforcement Program (EEP)

Following a New York Times/Frontline investigation into a spate of deaths and injuries at
McWane Pipe, OSHA established the EEP to supplement the NEP/LEP system and the
SST program. EEP was designed to target recalcitrant employers in high-risk industries,
in particular, employers that have multiple worksites with similar potential hazards. EEP
is a program that is triggered after an OSHA inspection. When an incident triggers an
EEP, OSHA uses a number of enhanced enforcement techniques, including: notifying the
company’s corporate headquarters (to give them notice and opportunity to correct similar
hazards at other sites), imposing more stringent requirements for settlement negotiations,
carrying out follow-up inspections, raising the priority of inspections of the company’s other
worksites under SST, and obtaining enforcement orders if the company fails to abate the
hazard and holding the company in contempt if it still does not abate.19
Five years after EEP began, OSHA’s inspector general (IG) found serious flaws with OSHA’s
implementation of it in three regions.20 Not only did the OSHA staff fail to designate
appropriate cases for the EEP, thereby hampering the program’s effectiveness from the start,
but the staff also failed in every aspect of the follow-up procedures. Furthermore, the IG
found that revisions to the EEP program requirements in 2008 substantially limited the
number of cases that could be designated for EEP follow-up procedures.
Other problems with the EEP include an unduly high bar for initiating action. OSHA
recognizes six triggers for EEP designation, but three of them require that the inspection
was prompted by a fatality. Even when there has been a fatality, there may not be an
EEP designation. OSHA will only designate a firm for EEP if, in addition to the fatality,
a number of other criteria are met. Those criteria focus on the type of violation that
led to the death and the employer’s compliance history. But compliance history is only a
useful measure of a firm’s concern for its workers’ health and safety if the firm has been
the subject of regular inspections over the years. Given OSHA’s resource constraints and
the vast number of covered worksites, it is unlikely any individual firm has a significant
inspection history. If the EEP is worth doing, it is worth doing right. And OSHA still has a
long way to go in putting into place a program that severely punishes egregious violators and
effectively discourages future scofflaws.
Fine Assessment

The failings of the EEP only affect OSHA’s ability to deal with the most recalcitrant
violators of the OSH Act. The larger problem with OSHA’s post-inspection procedures is a
weak system for administering penalties after finding violations at any workplace. Beginning
with penalties that have low statutory limits, inspectors and then supervisors in OSHA’s
area offices, regional offices, and national headquarters regularly exercise their discretionary
power to reduce penalties to levels so low that they have little deterrent effect on employers.
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TABLE 2.

OSH Act
•
•
•
•

Comparison of Statutory Penalties
Endangered Species Act

Serious violation: $7,000
Falsifying records: $10,000
Willful violation: $70,000
Willful violation that results in death:
$250,000 (indiv.) or $500,000 (corp.),
plus imprisonment for 6 months.

• Knowing violation of the ESA: $25,000
• Knowing violation of ESA regulations:
$12,000 or $25,000 (depending on
regulation)
• Criminal penalties: $50,000 and 1-year
imprisonment for knowing violation of
ESA or certain regulations; $25,000 and
6 mos. for other regulations.

Clean Air Act
• Civil penalty: $25,000 per day, per
violation
• Criminal penalties: up to 5 years’
imprisonment for some violations, up
to 15 years’ for others

A study by the majority staff of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions (HELP) shows that OSHA’s internal policies regarding penalty determination
effectively transform the OSH Act’s allowance for penalty reductions into a mandate.21
Inspectors’ template worksheets for calculating fines require discount calculations from the
start. Then, area directors, regional administrators, and Department of Labor attorneys can
reduce penalties further – and often do, after informal conferences with cited employers.
Finally, OSHA officials can reduce penalties if the cited employer challenges the citation
and enters into settlement negotiations with the agency. Looking at all fatality investigations
in 2007, the Senate HELP committee staff found that the median penalty initially assessed
by OSHA investigators ($5,900 after calculating discounts) was reduced by 38 percent over
the course of the internal review and conference with the cited employer. Even in cases of
more derelict conduct – willful violations of the OSH Act that led to an employee’s death –
the report found that, in 2007, there was a 58-percent decrease from the initial to the final
penalty. The median final penalty in fatality cases in 2007 was just $3,675.
OSHA claims that penalty reductions are necessary to spur settlements. OSHA feels
compelled to settle cases because it lacks the resources to litigate. But no deterrencebased enforcement scheme can function properly unless the economic consequences of
committing violations are considerably higher than the costs of avoiding compliance in the
first place discounted by the probability of detection. The interminable cycle of imposing
minimal penalties may in fact create perverse incentives to ignore the law because getting
caught is so much less expensive than steadfastly assuring compliance with OSHA standards.
Until very recently, OSHA has made reducing fines to pennies on the dollar its normal policy,
even in cases involving willful violations leading to fatalities. Its failure to pursue strong
penalties, even in appropriate cases, suggests undue deference to the business community.
These enforcement failures are among the most important reasons why the agency needs
more adequate funding.
OSHA’s Cooperative Enforcement Programs
OSHA has developed a number of voluntary and cooperative programs to complement
its traditional enforcement programs and foster a more symbiotic relationship between
Workers at Risk: Regulatory Dysfunction at OSHA
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the agency, regulated industry, and workers. Employers and some agency officials tout the
programs as highly effective tools, but independent analysis by GAO and others suggests
that OSHA lacks the hard data that would enable it to prove any of the cooperative
programs are truly effective.22
Voluntary Protection Program (VPP)

OSHA established the VPP in 1982 to recognize worksites that have comprehensive safety
and health management programs designed to maintain a safe workplace and below-average
injury rates as compared to the rest of their industry. The program got off to a slow start,
taking twenty years to attract the first 1,000 worksites. But the Bush administration made it
a priority to expand the program and, between 2002 and 2008, it doubled in size. There are
now so many participants that the regional OSHA administrators who are responsible for
primary administration of the program have complained that they do not have the resources
to continue adding new worksites.23
The huge growth in VPP worksites can be attributed to the fact that participation in
the program immunizes a worksite from all programmed inspections. Immunity from
programmed inspections can be a significant benefit for any worksite that might fall
within a local or national emphasis program, as evidenced by reports on the first year of
implementation of the petroleum refineries NEP. Across the country, OSHA started 65
inspections at petroleum refineries and inspectors have issued citations at each of the 48
worksites where inspections have concluded. Inspectors have found alarming numbers of
violations at some sites. At just 14 refineries, OSHA inspectors uncovered 1,517 violations,
including 1,489 violations for process safety management.24 Yet, OSHA will not inspect
20 percent of the petroleum refineries under federal jurisdiction because they participate in
the VPP and therefore enjoy exemptions from inspection under the NEP. The exemptions
would be acceptable if the VPP program actually works to protect workers, but OSHA
does not know whether this is true. A GAO report found that OSHA had continued to
expand the VPP program without collecting any data, much less analyzing any, to show
that the program has produced any measureable impact on worker health and safety.25
Following that report, OSHA’s acting head under President Obama, Jordan Barab, instituted
a comprehensive review of the VPP.
GAO’s report had examples of how OSHA’s failure to vet its program endangered workers.
The investigation found 30 VPP sites at which 32 fatalities occurred between January 2003
and August 2008. At the time of GAO’s investigation, five sites had voluntarily withdrawn
from the VPP, five had been given a one-year conditional status, and three had not yet been
reviewed by regional staff because enforcement investigations were ongoing. Seventeen
were allowed to remain in the VPP. Incredibly, one of those 17 retained its VPP status
despite having had three separate fatalities over the five-year period GAO investigated. In
the same report, GAO “found that, for 12 percent of the sites, at least one of their three-
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year average injury and illness rates was higher than the average injury and illness rates for
their industries.”
State Consultation Programs

OSHA’s other longstanding voluntary compliance program is the state consultation
program. Created in 1975, the consultation program funds state-based entities to provide
free occupational safety and health consultations to businesses that request them. The
occupational health and safety professionals who conduct the consultations are generally
employed by state agencies or universities, and they are responsible for identifying hazards
and potential violations, suggesting means for abating the hazards, and working with
employers to implement abatement techniques as well develop broader health and safety
programs. The consultation program is intended to benefit small employers in highhazard industries, although “small” is defined for this program as a worksite with up to 250
employees run by a company with up to 500 employees companywide.
Much like the VPP, participation in a consultation program can immunize employers from
OSHA programmed inspections. In addition, hazards uncovered during consultation
visits, even if they rise to the level of a serious violation, will not result in penalties. In
an employer’s worst-case scenario, a serious violation will only be referred to OSHA
enforcement staff after the state consultant has proffered a remedy and the employer has
failed to implement the remedy within a reasonable time. By offering these incentives
for participating in the program, OSHA has undermined, to some extent, its emphasis
programs, since small employers in industries covered by emphasis programs often request
consultations to forestall inspections.
As with the VPP, OSHA does not collect enough data to determine whether the consultation
program is having any positive impact on employees’ health and safety. OSHA did not
formally study the issue until 2002 – almost 30 years after the program began – when
GAO suggested that it do so. The researchers commissioned by OSHA to assess the state
consultation programs’ effectiveness found some potential benefits, but determined that
the benefits might actually be the result of other factors, such as employer motivation (if
employers who have a penchant for helping their employees are more likely to request
consultations, the program might be getting undue credit).26 Ultimately, they concluded
that additional data were necessary if OSHA wants to properly evaluate the consultation
programs. Unfortunately, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
through its Paperwork Reduction Act powers, prevented OSHA from gathering data from a
large number of companies that participated in the consultation programs. OMB rejected
OSHA’s request to collect information from any firm employing less than 40 people, a
restriction that eliminates “a significant portion” of program participants and contributes
to OSHA’s inability to fully assess the effectiveness of its voluntary programs, according to
GAO.27
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Divided and Conquered
When Congress passed the OSH Act in 1970, it opted for a separation of policymaking
functions that has had significant consequences for the development of federal occupational
safety and health policies. Congress divided the responsibility for protecting workers
among three agencies – OSHA, NIOSH, and the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (OSHRC). NIOSH was tasked with researching causes of, and solutions
to, occupational safety and health problems. OSHA, of course, was given the power to
promulgate and enforce safety and health standards. And OSHRC was put in charge of
adjudicating disputes between OSHA and employers who wanted to challenge a citation for
failure to comply with the agency’s standards. Not only did Congress divide occupational
safety and health policymaking authority between the three agencies, it set up administrative
barriers between them. OSHA was placed in the Department of Labor, NIOSH was
set up in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now Health and Human
Services), and OSHRC was established as an independent commission made up of three
commissioners appointed by the President for staggered terms.
The Research Divide
Because NIOSH’s research agenda does not always track OSHA’s research agenda,
NIOSH’s research is unused or underused by OSHA’s regulatory staff, who end up doing
or commissioning research that could have been done by NIOSH. In the mid-1990s, some
members of Congress found the NIOSH-OSHA coordination problems to be so severe that
they attempted to eliminate NIOSH, “claiming NIOSH duplicates the research of OSHA, the
EPA, the National Safety Council, and private industry.”28 A bifurcated leadership structure
is partly to blame. With no specific person or office in charge of coordinating NIOSH
research and OSHA’s needs, it is inevitable that their paths would stray. Further, NIOSH, in
response to calls for its dissolution, made the strategic choice to adopt two new programs
that effectively detached NIOSH from OSHA completely. First, NIOSH established a new
research prioritization program called NORA (National Occupational Research Agenda)
that marginalized OSHA’s input into NIOSH’s future direction. Second, NIOSH began
emphasizing a “research to practice,” or “r2p,” mission, in which
Table 3. NORA Council Structure
the primary target for NIOSH’s research is not OSHA, but
Number of OSHA
employers, employees, and their representatives.
Sector Council
Staff on Council
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing

NORA operates under a committee structure that includes such
Construction
a wide variety of stakeholders that it marginalizes OSHA’s role in
Healthcare and Social Assistance
setting NIOSH’s agenda. Granted, the NORA sector programs
Manufacturing
are not the sole determinant of NIOSH’s research agenda.
Mining
NIOSH’s work is also organized into 24 “cross-sector” programs
Services
that are linked to specific adverse health outcomes, statutory
Transportation,
Warehousing, Utilities
programs, and global efforts. The cross-sector programs include,
for example, musculoskeletal disorders, exposure assessment, and
Wholesale and Retail Trade

0 of 61
4 of 133
1 of 34
1 of 56
n/a
1 of 70
0 of 60
0 of 35
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nanotechnology. But, as with the NORA sector councils, the cross-sector program agendas
are not developed through consultation with OSHA as a matter of standard practice, thereby
limiting their utility for OSHA.
At NIOSH’s request, the National Academies of Science undertook a systematic review
of several NORA and cross-sector research programs to assess their relevance and
effectiveness in relation to occupational health. Tellingly, NAS scored the relevance of
the different programs’ research agendas on two factors: (1) whether research focused on
high-priority research areas (not necessarily priorities for OSHA); and (2) whether NIOSH
appropriately transferred its research results to employers and employees (transfer to OSHA
was essentially an afterthought). So, for example, NIOSH’s respiratory disease (cross-sector)
research program received a top score for relevance even though NAS concluded that
“[c]urrent institutional silos [between NIOSH and other relevant federal agencies] obstruct
the efficient use of resources and development of knowledge.”29
Congress intended that NIOSH be the scientific arm of OSHA, which clearly has not
happened. Congress separated NIOSH from OSHA to protect the integrity of its scientific
enterprise, but this separation comes at a high price—its output is of limited utility to
OSHA. Other agencies, such as FDA and EPA have their scientists in house, proving that
this divide is unnecessary.
The Enforcement Divide
While the NIOSH-OSHA division of power slows the development of new health and
safety standards, the OSHA-OSHRC split creates complicates the enforcement of what few
standards OSHA develops. Congress adopted the split-enforcement model in the OSH Act
in response to claims from industry that employers’ rights to due process are best preserved
when the prosecuting agency (OSHA) is institutionally separated from the adjudicating
agency (OSHRC).30 But there is little evidence that these perceived benefits outweigh
problems with efficiency and policy coordination. Employers’ challenges to OSHA citations
can take many years to resolve and, in the meantime, the employer can delay abatement of
the cited hazard. At times, OSHRC has been without its full complement of commissioners
because of disputes between the President and the Senate over certain nominees. A partial
commission can be responsible for significant delays in the appellate process. OSHA,
however, has no means of insisting that OSHRC do a more efficient job of resolving claims.
Moreover, OSHRC works as a one-way ratchet: employers can challenge OSHA citations,
but employees and their representatives have no power to challenge the terms of settlement
agreements between employers and OSHA. Unlike settlement agreements negotiated under
the Clean Air Act and other public health-related statutes, OSHA’s settlements are not
subject to public review and comment.
Another problem with the split-enforcement model is its effect on OSHA’s ability to
interpret the OSH Act and its regulations to protect workers. For years after Congress
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passed the OSH Act, OSHRC took the position that Congress, by granting the Commission
the power to adjudicate disputes about OSHA citations, gave it the power to make broad
policy determinations. OSHA, on the other hand, argued that OSHRC should accept
OSHA’s interpretations of the OSH Act and simply engage in case-specific fact-finding
to affirm, modify, or vacate individual OSHA citations and penalties. In 1991, in Martin v.
OSHRC, the Supreme Court sided with OSHA in holding that reviewing courts must defer
to OSHA’s interpretation of the OSH Act contained in its regulations when confronted with
conflicting, but reasonable, interpretations held by OSHA and OSHRC.31
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s unambiguous recognition of OSHA’s fundamental
supremacy in setting occupational safety and health policy, OSHRC keeps fighting to
retain policymaking power by reading the Supreme Court’s opinion in a narrow manner.32
OSHRC’s trick is to argue that OSHA’s reading of its own standards or the OSH Act are
unreasonable, allegedly making Martin inapplicable and giving OSHRC the power to decide
the case based on its own interpretation.33 In one case, OSHRC used that approach, was
overturned by the Eighth Circuit, and drafted such a narrow follow-up decision that one
prominent attorney for large employers suggested OSHRC’s interpretation of the relevant
law might apply everywhere but the Eighth Circuit.34
Until OSHRC is directed to defer to OSHA’s policymaking decisions, disputes between the
two institutions will continue to arise, sowing seeds of confusion for employers, employees,
and OSHA inspectors. Only one other agency in the entire federal government is the
subject of a similar arrangement – the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). In
the rest of the government, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) protects the rights of
defendants without the problems that result from the split-enforcement arrangement.
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Recordkeeping Woes
While we can say with certainty that too many workers contract illnesses, suffer injuries,
and are killed in this country as a result of hazardous working conditions, recordkeeping
problems at OSHA and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) prevent the detailed analysis of
illness, injury, and fatality data that would enable OSHA’s staff to determine the best targets
for enforcement and the most effective regulatory tools. OSHA depends on three databases
– BLS’s Annual Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII), BLS’s Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries (CFOI), and OSHA’s Integrated Management Information System
(IMIS) – that need to be improved.
BLS – SOII
Each year, BLS surveys about 174,000 establishments to gather data from their OSHArequired injury and illness logs. BLS uses these data to estimate the total number of injuries
and illnesses suffered by U.S. workers. Researchers have found that BLS likely misses
between 20 and 70 percent of all injuries and illnesses.35 The SOII will have some inherent
uncertainty, since it is based on a sampling survey and not a comprehensive and precise
count of injuries or illnesses, but the uncertainty could be minimized. There are three main
reasons why the SOII data are incomplete:
1. BLS focuses only on occupations covered by the OSH Act, so injuries and illnesses
suffered by the self-employed, household workers, workers on small farms (i.e., less
than 11 employees), and federal government employees are not counted. State government employees are only counted for state-level statistics.
2. BLS’s reliance on employers’ OSHA logs reduces the likelihood that long-latency
illnesses (e.g., cancer caused by air contaminants) will be counted. Employers do not
track illnesses suffered by former employees.
3. Employers’ safety programs include both disincentives for reporting work-related
injuries or illnesses (disciplinary actions and mandatory drug testing following
on-the-job injuries) and incentives for keeping quiet (prizes awarded for extended
periods without reported injuries). The programs help employers minimize workers’
compensation premiums and reduce the possibility for OSHA inspections.
BLS is currently working with OSHA and state agencies to figure out a way to count injuries
or illnesses suffered by public employees. In addition, BLS is surveying individual employers
to determine why some injuries and illnesses are reported to workers’ compensation
programs but not on OSHA logs. Finally, BLS is working with NIOSH on a pilot program
that uses multiple databases – not just OSHA logs – to estimate injury and illness rates.36
BLS – CFOI
The strong point of the CFOI is that it uses a variety of data sources with the goal of
developing a comprehensive census, rather than just a survey, of occupational fatalities.
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Following a critical 1987 report by the National Academies of Science that suggested BLS
had uncounted fatalities by up to 50 percent, it established a new system for obtaining data
from a variety of sources. As a result, many occupational fatalities are counted in the CFOI
database. But the CFOI only captures accurately deaths caused by occupational injury.
Deaths caused by occupational illnesses, particularly long-latency illnesses, are not accurately
captured, greatly reducing the CFOI’s coverage and its utility for OSHA in setting health
standards.
OSHA – IMIS
While the CFOI and SOII numbers are useful tools for setting rulemaking priorities or
targeting industries and worksites for inspection, OSHA needs another database to analyze
retrospectively the effectiveness of its inspection programs. Following each inspection,
OSHA inspectors record the results of the inspection and all relevant information about
penalties and settlements in the IMIS database. If the system functioned well, it would
organize and make accessible large amounts of information that OSHA officials could
use to determine the effectiveness of enforcement emphasis programs, consultation and
voluntary programs, and other efforts to improve occupational health and safety.
However, the decades-old database has serious functionality issues, and gaps in the data it
contains greatly limit its utility. IMIS was originally designed in the 1980s, and the basic
software has not been updated since. Its obsolescence is well recognized, but OSHA
currently has no plans to update the system. GAO has documented the fundamental flaws
in IMIS that frustrate any formal analyses of OSHA inspections. For instance, individual
worksites are not assigned unique identifiers, so inspections, consultations, worker injuries,
and other key datapoints cannot be linked easily.
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Recommendations for Reform
With its inadequate resources, outmoded statutory authority, misbalanced emphasis on
voluntary compliance programs, imprecise understanding of injury and illness rates, and
the almost complete failure to issue safety and health standards, OSHA was in dire straits
when George W. Bush left office. Fortunately, President Obama has appointed a Secretary
of Labor, Hilda Solis, and OSHA officials, David Michaels and Jordan Barab, all of whom
have professional backgrounds that evidence a strong belief in OSHA’s capacity to be an
agent for positive change. To affect that change, OSHA will need more resources and an
improved statute. But OSHA should also focus its attention on reforms that the agency
can implement without the need to mobilize the broad resources necessary to accomplish
legislative reform. CPR is in the process of convening a work group of national experts
to develop a blueprint for overhauling OSHA, using all available tools, including dramatic
increases in the agency’s budget and new statutory authority. This paper, intended to
be a threshold analysis of what makes OSHA so dysfunctional, will therefore confine
itself to administrative reforms that are within the existing legal authority of the Obama
Administration to implement.
Enforcement
For the first time in decades, OSHA’s enforcement staff is growing. The 111th Congress
and the Obama Administration provided OSHA with the funds to hire 130 new inspectors,
many of whom will be bilingual.

As important as it is for OSHA to build its enforcement staff, it is more important
that the enforcement program be properly designed to maximize the staff ’s
effectiveness. OSHA’s new leadership should reassess the scope and design of the
special emphasis programs used to target inspections. Certain NEPs have broader
implications than others. For instance, OSHA analysis of the chemical or petroleum refining
industries’ successes and failures in implementing process safety management (PSM) policies
might help OSHA understand how PSM can be used effectively in other industries. But
other NEPs – those focused on specific hazards or industries – might be targeting phantom
problems or workplaces that are less hazardous than those that would be targeted through
the SST program or through local and regional emphasis programs that do a better job of
taking into account the professional experiences of inspection staff.
OSHA inspectors should expand their use of the general duty clause to better
protect workers from health hazards. Hundreds of chemicals used by industry lack
OSHA-derived permissible exposure limits (PELs), limiting OSHA inspectors’ ability to
protect workers through the use of citations. This failure to protect workers exists even for
chemicals that have been identified as hazards by another government or standard-setting
NGO. OSHA has the power to cite employers for general duty clause violations when an
employee is exposed to a recognized hazard that has caused or is likely to cause death or
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serious physical harm, and there is a feasible means of abating the hazard. Where an outside
group has established an occupational health standard that is well-recognized and feasible,
OSHA should use that standard as the basis for a general duty clause citation against any
employer whose employees are exposed to the chemical above the standard.
OSHA’s post-inspection procedures are also ripe for review. The statutory limits on
penalties for violating the OSH Act are strikingly lower than limits under other public health
and safety statutes, yet OSHA’s standard practice is to discount proposed penalties before
announcing them. This policy not only puts the agency in a poor negotiating position
against the employer found to be in violation of the law, but also reduces the deterrent effect
of OSHA’s enforcement program on other employers. Following the 2009 inspection of
BP’s Texas City refinery, OSHA proposed full penalties for each of the 439 willful violations
of the PSM standard that OSHA inspectors discovered, leading to a record fine of $87.4
million. OSHA should employ a similar “get tough” policy in appropriate cases, rather than
automatically reducing fines to prompt settlements.

Further, OSHA should enhance its criminal enforcement arm. Between 2003 and
2007, OSHA inspectors referred just 21 percent of eligible cases to the Department of
Justice for prosecution, and DOJ chose to pursue just 4 percent of the referred cases.37
The Solicitor of Labor should work with OSHA’s enforcement division to train inspectors
to gather better evidence for criminal violations of the OSH Act. But in light of the
weak criminal penalties in the OSH Act, the agency should also work with state and local
prosecutors to prompt state criminal indictments of employers following the death of a
worker in circumstances where such a penalty is warranted. OSHA could employ specially
trained inspectors to assist local authorities in gathering the necessary evidence and the
Solicitor of Labor could designate a lawyer in his office to serve as a liaison with state and
local officials for this purpose. Cal-OSHA has employed this approach with some success.
In any enforcement case that OSHA chooses to settle with a cited employer, OSHA
should allow the public an opportunity to comment on the consent order or other
terms of the settlement. The public, especially employees, their representatives, and
the victims or families of victims injured in an accident should have a chance to see the
proposed terms of settlement and comment in writing to OSHA’s attorneys. Other public
health statutes (e.g., the Clean Air Act)38 require government agencies to publish in the
Federal Register a notice of settlement agreements. Even without an amendment to the OSH
Act, OSHA has the power to involve stakeholders in the process of settling enforcement
actions.
OSHA must also reassess the proper balance between traditional enforcement (i.e.,
inspections) and compliance assistance. With its current inspection force, OSHA only
has the capacity to undertake formal investigations at a fraction of worksites in a given year.
Compliance assistance programs – in particular, the consultation program – can provide a
useful tool for ensuring that employers are fulfilling their duties under the OSH Act, but
these programs are only suitable for some situations. Large employers do not fit the profile
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of companies that need the free resources provided by the state compliance assistance
programs. Large employers, for example, can presumably hire staff or consultants to
assist them in complying with OSHA standards. The VPP may be more suitable for large
employers, but OSHA should revise the standards for participation. To earn the recognition
that comes with participation in the VPP, companies should be required to do more than
establish that they have lower-than-average injury and illness rates. They should demonstrate
a commitment to worker health and safety by voluntarily adopting more stringent health
and safety controls than those minimally required by law (e.g., by adopting TLVs in place of
PELs). And OSHA should drop employers that fail to maintain exemplary records from the
VPP program. VPP participants are exempted from certain inspections, and they should
have to earn that privilege.

OSHA has renewed its request with OMB to survey some smaller employers. OMB
should approve OSHA’s request or, better yet, expand it to cover a larger number
of small employers so that OSHA can assess the effectiveness of its consultation
programs. More broadly, OSHA should ask OMB for additional funding and authority to
collect data that evaluates whether its consultation and other cooperative programs have a
positive impact on employer’s safety and health records.
Recordkeeping

In order for OSHA and stakeholders to properly assess the effectiveness of its
rules, enforcement priorities, and other regulatory programs, the agency needs to
significantly improve its recordkeeping policies. The most glaring problem is the
agency’s outdated Integrated Management Information System (IMIS), which was originally
designed to link enforcement data with other agency resources. But IMIS has not been
updated to take advantage of the vast improvements in computer hardware and software
since it originally came on-line in the 1980s. To make IMIS a truly integrated system, OSHA
should create unique identifiers for each employer and worksite and develop tools for linking
the agency’s enforcement records to employer injury and illness logs, workers’ compensation
records, and social security disability records. IMIS should also have a web-based interface
(with adequate privacy protections) that would enable employers, workers, union officials,
researchers, and other interested parties to access all records. The Obama Administration
should ask Congress for a one-time appropriation to hire staff and/or consultants to
modernize the IMIS system as suggested above.
OSHA also needs to work with the Bureau of Labor Statistics to improve the quality
of national injury and illness statistics. Academic researchers have developed techniques
for combining multiple data sources in a way that enables them to provide better estimates
of the incidence of occupational injuries and illnesses than OSHA’s and BLS’s programs.
Those researchers have uncovered systematic undercounting by OSHA and BLS that
undermine OSHA’s efforts to identify and eliminate occupational hazards.
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Furthermore, OSHA needs to address the incentives (e.g., prizes) and disincentives
(e.g., disciplinary actions and drug testing) that employers use to prevent employees
from reporting all occupational injuries and illnesses. GAO has identified these
tricks of the trade as one of the most significant causes of occupational injury and illness
undercounting.39 OSHA should consider the regulatory tools it could use to eliminate these
programs.
Rulemaking
The OSH Act’s § 6(b) standard-setting process is an abject failure. Of the more than 60,000
chemicals in commerce, OSHA has set standards for fewer than 1,000. The rulemaking
process has essentially ground to a halt: In the past ten years, OSHA has finalized just a
handful of new standards, one of them under court order. And to make matters worse,
most of the health standards that OSHA has published are widely recognized as out-of-date
and underprotective.

OSHA should seek from OMB additional resources to beef up its regulation-writing
capacity. Far too often, OSHA has been unable to complete regulations, or has had to drop
them, because it lacks the staff to do the necessary work. Now that the administration has
expanded the number of inspectors at OSHA, it is time for the administration to expand
OSHA’s capacity to work on more than a few regulations at one time.
In the meantime, OSHA should seek ways of maximizing the impact of the few
safety and health standards that it has the budgetary capacity and legal authority to
promulgate. The Solicitor’s Office could potentially speed up rulemaking by reassessing
OSHA’s burden of proof under the Benzene case. Although the Supreme Court required
OSHA to demonstrate that exposure to the substance at issue poses a significant risk to
workers, it also recognized that OSHA would lack sufficient evidence to estimate workplace
health risk precisely. The Solicitor should consider whether such language opens the door
for OSHA to engage in a more truncated evaluation of risk evidence and if such a move
would make it possible for OSHA to promulgate health regulations more quickly.
OSHA should also consider how it can avoid rulemaking delays caused by
procedural hurdles imposed by other statutes.40 The Information Quality Act (a/k/a
“Data Quality Act”)41 instructed the Director of OMB to “provide policy and procedural
guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and
integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by Federal agencies.”
In 2002, the Department of Labor issued department-wide guidelines for implementing
the Data Quality Act that may require OSHA to send its risk assessments and economic
feasibility analyses out for peer review. The Data Quality Act itself does not require peer
review and OMB’s 2004 guidance on the subject leaves agencies with some discretion in
selecting the appropriate timing and scope of any peer review. OSHA should therefore run
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any peer reviews it deems necessary concurrently with public notice and comment periods
specified in notices of proposed rulemaking.

Focusing rulemaking on generic standards that apply more broadly than singlechemical regulations has the potential to greatly improve OSHA’s effectiveness.
OSHA has experience with three types of broadly applicable, or generic, standards –
industry-wide standards, multi-chemical standards, and work-practice standards. Utilizing
generic rules to combine multiple hazards or agenda items into one rulemaking allows
OSHA to engage stakeholders on a larger number of issues at each of these steps in the
rulemaking process, eliminating the need to address smaller subsets of issues in a piecemeal
fashion. While OSHA’s follow-up analysis of stakeholders’ input after each stage may take
longer, at least the agency will be able to reduce the number of advisory committees it must
convene, Federal Register notices it must publish, and hearings it must hold.
Moreover, the generic approach to rulemaking enables OSHA to address the full spectrum
of risks that workers face. Rarely are workers exposed to a single hazard – more often,
hazards exist in common combinations. OSHA’s standards should reflect the realities of
the workplace. As evidenced by the rise and fall of the ergonomics standard, however, the
generic approach to rulemaking can be highly controversial, so OSHA must be judicious in
its choice of rulemaking targets. Standards that apply to a single industry (e.g., refineries)
or a specific health concern (e.g., chemicals that cross the placenta) might be good choices.
OSHA should consider using a generic approach to update its PELs. By grouping PELs
into sets of four or five chemicals that either pose similar hazards or are present in common
work environments, OSHA might be able to move expeditiously through the hundreds of
PELs that need to be updated based on new knowledge about risks and risk management.
The White House, too, has a role to play in speeding up OSHA’s regulatory process. The
White House’s Office of Management and Budget should refrain from reviewing individual
OSHA regulatory proposals, concentrating its energy instead on assessing longer-term
issues. For instance, OMB’s OSHA-focused staff could do an independent review of the
efficacy of rulemaking versus voluntary compliance programs, in terms of occupational
health outcomes, in an effort to help OSHA properly balance its limited resources. If OMB
does not stop reviewing individual rules, OSHA should, at least, ensure better transparency
regarding OMB’s effect on the final rule by publishing all OMB comments in the relevant
docket. Finally, the White House could amend the OMB peer review guidelines to clarify
that agencies can conduct peer review during notice-and-comment periods.
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Conclusion
The distinctive characteristics of a dysfunctional regulatory agency – a budget that is
obviously inadequate for the agency’s vast mission, a governing statute that has not been
modified to keep up with a modern regulatory environment, political interference with
regulatory policies, and a consequent failure to make ongoing improvements for the people
the agency is supposed to protect – appear in virtual caricature at OSHA. Congress, the
White House, and – most importantly – OSHA itself, must take steps to change course from
the path OSHA is taking toward obsolescence. The Obama Administration has taken some
steps in that direction, but more is needed to protect America’s workers.
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